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D o n ’t T h in k  A bout  E l e ph a n t s: 
R eece  v . C ity  of Ed m o n to n1
Katie Sykes* and Vaughan Black**
- Okay, here’s me planting an idea in your head. I say to you, 
“Don't think about elephants. ” What are you thinking about?
- Elephants}
In t r o d u c t io n
Lucy is a 36-year-old female Asian elephant who lives at the Edmonton Valley Zoo,3 
owned by the City of Edmonton. Once, when she was a baby, she was free. She was 
bom in Sri Lanka and captured there in 1975 as an orphan less than a year old.4 She 
was acquired by the Edmonton Valley Zoo in 1977, and she has been confined there 
ever since. She is the only elephant in the zoo, and she is the northernmost elephant 
housed alone in North America.5
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1 Reece et al v Edmonton (City), 2011 ABCA 238, affirming Reece v Edmonton (City), 2010 ABQB 538 
[Reece (QB)], leave to appeal to SCC refused, 34454 (April 26,2012). Our thanks to Sheila Wildeman 
for proposing the title of this comment.
2 This dialogue is from Inception (Warner Bros, 2010), a science-fiction film about spies who enter their 
targets’ subconscious minds to extract information from them. The example -  sometimes “don’t think of 
a pink elephant” -  is often used both by cognitive scientists and in popular discourse to illustrate that the 
paradox of trying to suppress thought; the inevitable result of hearing the instruction is to disobey it, since 
it cannot be processed without elephants entering the addressee’s mind.
3 “Lucy News,” City of Edmonton web site, online:
http://www.edmonton.ca/attractions_recreation/attractions/edmonton_valley_zoo/lucy-news.aspx 
(accessed November 14,2011).
4 Debi 7immerman] “One Veterinarian’s Search for the Truth in the ‘Lucy the Elephant’ Debate” (30 June 
2009) at 4 (report online at http://www.savelucy.ca/expert-opinions).
5 Ibid.
Concerned citizens, animal organizations and public figures have been 
advocating for years for Lucy to be moved from the zoo to an elephant sanctuary, 
where she could live with more space, in a warmer climate, and in the company of 
other elephants.6 Advocates for the move argue that Lucy suffers from debilitating 
physical and emotional deficits caused by the basic unsuitability of life in a Canadian 
zoo for a very large, naturally far-ranging, and highly social animal. Her problems 
include respiratory disease, chronic foot problems, obesity from lack of exercise, and 
social isolation.7 The zoo’s position is that Lucy is well cared for and that moving 
her would be dangerous because of her respiratory condition.8
In 2010 a local animal activist, Tove Reece, together with Zoocheck and 
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, turned to the courts to try to bring 
about a change in Lucy’s situation. Reece filed an application with the Court of 
Queen’s Bench seeking a declaration that the City was in violation of section 2(1) of 
the Animal Protection Act, which prohibits causing or permitting an animal to be in 
distress.9
6 As discussed in the reasons for judgment of the Alberta Court of Appeal, in 2007 Zoocheck Canada 
(Zoocheck), an animal protection organization that focuses on the well-being of wild animals, wrote to the 
Edmonton Humane Society objecting to the conditions under which Lucy was kept, prompting an 
investigation by the Humane Society. Reece, supra note 1 at para 5. In 2009,36 C anad ian  authors signed 
a letter to the City advocating for Lucy to be moved to an elephant sanctuary. “Canadian authors call on 
Edmonton to move zoo elephant,” CBC News (22 May 2009), online:
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/story/2009/05/22/edmonton-lucy-elephant-authors.html. The 
text of the letter is available at http://www.zoocheck.com/campaigns_elephant_Lucyauthorsletter.html. 
Bob Barker, former host of The Price is Right and a prominent advocate for animal welfare, offered the 
City $100,000 if it would permit outside veterinary experts to examine Lucy. “Is price right? Bob Barker 
offers $100K for Edmonton elephant’s checkup” The Star (22 March 2011), online: 
http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/article/958780--is-price-right-bob-barker-offers-100k-for-edmonton- 
elephant-s-checkup?bn= 1.
7 See the medical reports on Lucy (obtained from the City through a Freedom of Information request) as 
well as expert reports and other materials posted on Zoocheck’s web site at 
http://www.zoocheck.com/campaigns_elephant_res.html. See also the discussion of the evidentiary 
record in Fraser CJA’s dissenting reasons in Reece, supra note 1 at paras 103-107.
8 “Investigation Confirms Zoo Complies with Legislation in Caring for Lucy” (19 January 2011), City of 
Edmonton, online: http://www.edmonton.ca/investigation-confirms-zoo-com.aspx.
9 RSA 2000 c A-41. Under the Act, an animal is defined as being in distress if it is deprived of adequate 
shelter, ventilation, space, food, water or veterinary care or reasonable protection from injurious heat or 
cold; if it is injured, sick, in pain or suffering; or abused or subjected to undue hardship, privation or 
neglect (s 1(2)). The prohibition on causing distress (or permitting it to be caused) does not apply if 
distress “results from an activity carried on in accordance with the regulations or in accordance with 
reasonable and generally accepted practices of animal care, management, husbandry, hunting, fishing, 
trapping, pest control or slaughter” (s 2(2)). Section 2.1 provides that “a person who owns or is in charge 
of an animal” has an affirmative duty to care for it by ensuring that it has adequate food or water, 
providing adequate care when the animal is wounded or ill, providing reasonable protection from heat and 
cold, and providing the animal with adequate shelter, ventilation and space. As noted in the dissenting 
reasons in Reece (supra note 1 at para 73 no 42), it is not clear that the generally accepted practices 
exemption in s. 2(2) applies to the duties in s 2.1.
Reece’s originating notice was struck out as an abuse of process and on the 
basis that she and the other claimants lacked standing.10 On appeal to the Alberta 
Court o f Appeal, this decision was upheld. The determinative issue at both the lower 
court and the Court of Appeal was abuse of process: as the chambers judge wrote, 
the proceedings were barred by the rule that “no private individual can bring an 
action to enforce the criminal law.”11 Adopting this reasoning, Slatter J.A., writing 
for the majority, held that the proceeding fell into a recognized category of abuse of 
process, “where proceedings are used to enforce or engage punitive penal statutes.” 
The question of standing was treated as subsidiary to this issue.
The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed Reece’s application for leave to
appeal.
Thinking and Not Thinking About Elephants
The case raised questions about how procedural doctrines like abuse of process and 
standing limit, and are limited by, the principle of access to justice. These questions 
are of special importance in cases where unorthodox legal theories are advanced -  
and where, as in this case, justice is sought on behalf of one of a class of beings 
against whom the courthouse door has traditionally been barred.
The Reece decision is noteworthy for a lengthy (almost five times as long as 
the majority reasons) and wide-ranging dissent by Fraser C.J.A. The dissent engages 
in remarkable depth with questions including the relationship between human beings 
and animals, the debate over the existence of “animal rights,” and the nature and 
effectiveness of legal provisions for the protection of animals. These matters are 
gradually gaining more prominence in both scholarly and public debate, but to see 
them addressed at all in an appellate court decision is surprising, and that they are 
given such thorough and sincere consideration is little short of astonishing. The only 
rival worldwide to Fraser C.J.A.’s dissent for engaging at length with the debate and 
scholarship around animal rights is the decision of the Supreme Court of Israel in its 
2003 judgment in Noach v The Attorney General.13
10 A third basis for the City’s motion, whether Reece’s action should have been commenced by filing a 
statement of claim rather than an originating notice, was discussed by both the Court of Queen’s Bench 
and the Court of Appeal but did not have a significant role in either judgment. Fraser C.J.A., in dissent, 
would have found that the proper vehicle for the claim was by way of statement of claim, because 
deciding the case on the merits involved disputed facts, and would have given the appellants leave to 
amend their pleadings (Reece, supra note 1 at para 198).
11 Reece (QB), supra note 1 at para 6.
12 Reece, supra note 1 at para 20.
13 HCJ 9232/01.
The disagreement between the Reece judgments boils down to whether 
there is any place for the consideration of such matters in this case, or (implicitly) in 
the legal arena at all. For Fraser C.J.A., the case is about the way an elephant is 
allegedly being treated. For the majority, it requires nothing more complicated than 
the near-mechanical application of a categorical rule of civil procedure. According 
to the majority, neither animals generally nor this elephant particularly is relevant to 
this exercise; the appeal “does not deal with animal rights or the propriety of Lucy’s 
care.”14 In short, the majority reasons manifest a sustained and strenuous -  not to 
mention unprecedentedly successful -  effort not to think about elephants.
Reasons for Judgment (Slatter J.A.)
Slatter J.A. describes the case in his opening paragraph as being “about the proper 
role of the courts in supervising day-to-day governmental operations.”15 The set-up 
is reminiscent of the classic judgments of Lord Denning; as soon as the matter has 
been crystallized in this way it is easy to predict what the outcome will be.16
As it turns out, however, the majority judgment does not focus primarily on 
the role of the courts in overseeing the conduct of government officials. The crux of 
the reasoning is that the proceedings are an abuse o f process because they involve an 
attempt by a private litigant in a civil proceeding to give effect to a penal provision. 
The cases cited by Slatter J.A. in which courts have refused relief of this nature all 
involve defendants who are private entities rather than public officials or bodies,17 
while in Reece, by contrast, it is the City o f Edmonton, a governmental body, which 
is alleged to be violating Alberta laws enacted to protect the welfare of animals. A 
principle that the dissent highlights as critical -  the ability of citizens to seek judicial 
review of unlawful government action -  recedes from view in Slatter J.A.’s reasons, 
based as they are on a rationale mainly drawn from case law where judicial 
evaluation of the government’s compliance with the law is not at issue.
14 Ibid at para 3.
15 Ibid at para 1.
16 For instance, it is predictable from opening line in Miller v Jackson [1977] QB 966 CA (Eng) at 976,
“In summertime village cricket is the delight of everyone,” that a nuisance injunction against the village 
cricketers is about to be struck down.
17 EdDeWolfe Trucking Ltd v Shore Disposal Ltd (1976), 16NSR(2d) 538 (NSSCAD) [Ed DeWolfe 
Trucking], discussed in ibid at 26; Manitoba Naturalists Society Inc v Ducks Unlimited Canada (1991), 79 
Man R (2d), 86 DLR (4th) 709 (QB), Rabbin v Craigmont Mines Ltd (1963), 42 WWR 157 (BCSC) and 
Mid West Television Ltd v SED Systems Inc (1981), 9 Sask R 199, [1981 3 WWR 560 (QB), discussed in 
ibid at para 28. These cases were also relied on by the Court of Queen’s Bench (see discussion in Reece 
(QB), supra note 1 at paras 36-40).
1. Civil Proceedings to Enforce Criminal Law
The majority’s central objection to the appellants’ action is not so much that it would 
subject government functions to judicial scrutiny as that it seeks to usurp the 
government’s responsibility to enforce Alberta’s animal protection laws. The 
declaration sought by the appellants would undermine “the jurisdiction of the 
criminal courts18 and “the authority of the Attorney General in the enforcement of 
the law.”19
Abuse of process is a concept perhaps most familiar in connection with 
attempts to re-litigate already settled issues. But this is merely a subcategory under 
an umbrella doctrine barring any proceeding that amounts to a misuse of the judicial 
system, or that “in some other way bring[s] the administration of justice into 
disrepute.”20 Slatter J.A. emphasizes that the residual power to strike pleadings for 
abuse of process is flexible and cannot be circumscribed by the particular categories 
of precedent like re-litigation of issues; “there is no universal test or statement of law 
that encompasses all of the examples”21 and “it is...not appropriate to take any 
judicial statement of the ambit of the doctrine of abuse of process, and apply it 
mechanically to different factual settings and issues.”22
The use of civil proceedings to enforce penal statutes is identified as a 
recognized category of abuse of process.23 Slatter J.A. holds that it is improper for a 
litigant to attempt such proceedings unless he or she has some private interest in 
addition to the general public interest in enforcement o f the penal law.24 Foremost 
among the authorities he cites for this proposition is the English case Gouriet v 
Union of Postal Workers.25 Gouriet, while it did not (like Reece) involve an attack 
on allegedly unlawful government conduct, addressed another issue that is also 
central to Reece: the scope of the discretion of government officials in making 
decisions about law enforcement.
18 Reece, supra note 1 at para 30.
19 Ibid at para 31.
20 Canam Enterprises Inc v Coles (2000), 51 OR (3d) 481 (CA) [Canam] at para 55, Goudge J.A., 
dissenting, cited in Reece, ibid at para 17.
21 Ibid at para 16.
22 Ibid at para 17.
23 Ibid at para 20.
24 Ibid at para 23.
25 [1978] AC 435 HL (Eng) [Gouriet].
2. Abuse of Process, Gouriet, and Standing
Gouriet is a tale of vintage 1970s politics (and also of vintage communications 
technology). The case arose out of an action by the UK postal workers’ union in 
solidarity with the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. In 1977 the union 
announced that for one week its members would refuse to handle any mail to or from 
South Africa. One Major John Prendergast Gouriet, founder of a conservative group 
called the National Association for Freedom,26 applied to the Attorney General for 
consent to seek an injunction against the union’s boycott by means of a relator 
action, through which the Attorney General could assert a public right in the civil 
courts at the proposal of a private citizen.27 The Attorney General, a member of the 
Labour government in power at the time, refused consent to Gouriet’s action; it had 
been “hinted,” as Lord Diplock observed, that “there could be no reasons that were 
not partizan for his refusal to authorise the bringing of a relator action.”28 Gouriet 
then sought declarations that in refusing to pursue the relator proceedings the 
Attorney General had exercised his discretion wrongfully,29 and that Gouriet was 
entitled to proceed against the union.30
The House of Lords held that Gouriet’s pleadings should be struck because 
“only the Attorney-General can sue on behalf of the public for the purpose of 
preventing public wrongs and ... a private individual cannot do so on behalf of the 
public” unless he personally would sustain an actionable injury as a result of the 
public wrong.31 The post office, its employees and the union all enjoyed broad 
statutory immunity from tort proceedings, so Gouriet could not have asserted that he 
had a private right to uninterrupted service that would be violated by the boycott.32
The term “abuse of process” is not actually used in Gouriet. The bar to 
Gouriet’s cause of action is for the most part characterized as a lack of jurisdiction, 
but Gouriet’s locus standi to pursue proceedings when the Attorney General had
26 It is of interest to note (in connection with a case that may or may not deal with animal rights) that in the 
2001 outbreak of foot and mouth disease in the UK Major Gouriet opposed the government’s policy of 
wholesale slaughter of infected animals and those at risk of infection, advocating the use of homeopathic 
borax as treatment. “Poor information on outbreaks”, Letter to the Editor, The Daily Telegraph (28 
February 2001) 29; Jon Ungoed-Thomas, “Foot and mouth slaughter toll hits a new high”, The Sunday 
Times (20 May 2001) 4.
27 Gouriet, supra note 25 at 477.
28 Ibid at 499.
29 Ibid at 473.
30 Ibid at 474.
31 Ibid at 490.
32 Ibid at 475.
refused to do so is also at issue.33 The test set out in Gouriet and applied by the 
Reece majority34 -  a private citizen cannot use civil process to enforce a penal law 
unless he or she has a private interest in the outcome -  underscores how closely the 
issues o f standing and a valid cause of action (or abuse of process) are related in a 
case of this nature. It duplicates in all essentials the general test for determining 
whether a private individual has standing to sue in respect of the breach of a public 
duty, which, as stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Finlay v. Canada 
(Minister of Finance)35 requires either breach of a private right of the plaintiff, or 
that breach of the public duty will result in damage peculiar to the plaintiff and 
distinct from that suffered by the public in general.36
But in Canadian law this general test for standing has been supplemented by 
the concept of public interest standing -  the doctrine that courts have inherent 
discretion to accord public interest standing to individual plaintiffs -  as developed in 
Thorson v. Canada (Attorney General),37 Nova Scotia Board of Censors v. McNeil38 
and Minister of Justice v. Borowski,39 and subsequently extended to non­
constitutional cases in Finlay. The Reece majority insists that whether a plaintiff has 
standing (either under the general rule or the public interest rule) and whether the 
action is an abuse of the court’s process are analytically distinct questions.40 This is 
a reasonable point, at least in the abstract. But when the test applied for abuse of 
process is substantially identical to the general test for standing absent the case law 
on public interest standing, it appears that the door opened up in the jurisprudence on 
public interest standing is being closed by a formalistic application of the doctrine of 
abuse of process.
33 Ibid at 515.
34 One commentator on Gouriet notes that the case has been criticised and that in Canada it “should be 
applied cautiously.” Thomas Cromwell, Locus Standi: A Commentary on the Law of Standing in Canada 
(Toronto: Carswell, 1986) at 184. There is little evidence of this restraint in the Reece majority’s use of 
Gouriet.
35 [1986] 2 SCR 607 [Finlay].
36 Ibid at paras 18-19.
37 [1975] 1 SCR 138.
38 [1976] 2 SCR 265.
39 [1981] 2 SCR 575. These three cases are often referred to collectively as the “standing trilogy.”
40 For this proposition, Slatter J.A. cites Le Dain J., in Finlay, “It is essential to distinguish, I think, 
between standing, or the right to seek particular relief, and the entitlement to such relief’ (Finlay, supra 
note 35 at para 37, cited in Reece, supra note 1 at para 25). The invocation of this statement is somewhat 
disingenuous, since Le Dain J. goes on to say in the same paragraph that such questions as whether the 
relief sought will lie against a government official are “to be left to the trial court” (Finlay, ibid), which is 
very close to Fraser C.J.A.’s position in dissent that the availability of a declaration as a remedy could not 
be decided summarily, but required a hearing on the merits (see, e.g., discussion in Reece, ibid at paras 
155-156, 168).
3. Relevance of Factual Allegations and Applicable Standard
The Reece appellants provided substantial affidavit and other evidence in support of 
their position, but Slatter J.A. maintains that none of this is relevant to the appeal. In 
interlocutory proceedings the facts are not before the court and do not need to be 
dealt with, even as “context.”41 Here, the majority ignores the familiar notion that if 
a claim is sought to be struck on a purely legal basis the facts are generally assumed 
as pleaded, in favour o f the plaintiff. That principle is perhaps most closely 
associated with motions to dismiss pleadings for failure to disclose a cause of action, 
but it extends to other interlocutory motions. In Gouriet, for example, Lord 
Wilberforce observed that “[t]he present proceedings are interlocutory only, so that 
Mr. Gouriet should be allowed to go on with his action unless it is manifestly ill- 
founded in law.” 42
The majority also rejects the importation (again, from the law on motions to 
strike for failing to disclose a cause of action) of the rule that it must be “plain and 
obvious” that the plaintiffs action cannot succeed. The majority variously 
characterizes the issue as “a discretionary finding,”43 thus insulating the chambers 
judge's ruling from reversal except in the case o f palpable and overriding error, and 
“a pure question of law,”44 thus depriving the applicants of the benefit o f the rule that 
cases not be dismissed at the preliminary stage unless it is plain and obvious they 
could never succeed. As Slatter J.A. observes, it is not clear from the case law 
whether the “plain and obvious” standard carries over to abuse of process.45 But it is 
clear -  although not acknowledged in the majority reasons -  that generally speaking 
in proceedings to strike out a cause of action at a preliminary stage there is at least a 
presumption in favour of allowing the plaintiff to proceed to a hearing on the merits, 
and a significant burden on the defendant to rebut it.46
The persuasiveness of the majority’s analysis is undermined because it 
amounts to a justification for peremptory dismissal of the appellants’ claims, lacking 
the full airing of the considerations on both sides that seems to be called for. Slatter
41 Reece, supra note 1 at para 13. The majority’s insistence that the factual disagreements about Lucy’s 
treatment are irrelevant and thus not before the court does not prevent it from referring to the factual 
record when such reference suits its purpose. In para 32 they note that there “is no suggestion on the 
record that the Attorney general has failed in his duty to enforce the law.”
42 Supra note 25 at 472.
43 Ibid at para 10.
44 Ibid at para 15.
45 Reece, supra note 1 at para 14.
46 See, e.g., Lord Wilberforces’s statement in Gouriet than an action must be “manifestly ill-founded” if it 
is not to be allowed to proceed (supra note 42, emphasis added).
J.A. frankly states that abuse of process is a discretionary47 and context-sensitive48 
doctrine that cannot be captured in a “universal test or statement of law.”49 But he 
applies this doctrine without undertaking the analysis one might expect to see of the 
competing principles weighed by courts when they adjudicate litigants’ entitlement 
to advance their claims. As the Ontario Court of Appeal noted in Canam, 
“[maintaining open and ready access to the courts by all legitimate suitors is 
fondamental to our system of justice.”50 This principle is limited by other, 
sometimes opposed, principles, ones that are also important to the integrity and 
proper functioning of the justice system, such as conservation of judicial resources 
and the avoidance of vexatious, harassing or futile litigation. Slatter J.A. manifests 
no serious attempt to address how these principles should be reconciled or balanced. 
In short, the majority resolves each subsidiary question in a way that stacks the deck 
against the appellants and chooses to err on the side of shutting out claims.
4. Who Will Guard the Zookeepers?
Even more significantly, the majority barely addresses the question that the dissent 
sees as central to the appeal: the availability of judicial review of governmental 
action that is alleged to be unlawful, or conversely the immunity of such action from 
judicial oversight. This is a serious issue with potentially profound implications, and 
the points that Fraser CJA raises in dissent are important enough to merit at least a 
response from the majority. The only response they receive is the assertion that the 
administrators of the Animal Protection Act, the humane societies, “are independent 
agencies (not agents o f the Government of Alberta).”51 This claim -  somewhat 
undercut by the majority’s later assertion that the statute’s real enforcer is the 
Attorney General, whose authority will be undermined if a claim of this sort is 
permitted52 -  is all that is expressly offered in reply to the “who will watch the 
watchman?” concern that is so central to the dissent’s argument.
Although Slatter J.A. is unequivocal in his stance that the case is not about 
animals and not about an elephant, it is hard not to speculate that the thinness of the 
majority’s analysis has something to do with a failure to take claims raised on behalf 
of the four-legged (and trunked) completely seriously. A hint that speculation of this 
nature might not be entirely unfounded can be found in one of Slatter J.A.’s
47 Reece, ibid at paras 17 and 22.
48 Ibid at para 14,16,17, and 19 (“It is...not appropriate to take any judicial statement of the ambit of the 
doctrine of abuse of process, and apply it mechanically to different factual settings and issues”).
49 Ibid at para 16,17.
50 Supra note 20 at para 34.
51 Reece, supra note 1 at para 11.
52 Ibid at para 31.
concluding statements: “The appellants argue that there is no other effective 
alternative to bring this issue before the courts. Stating the issue in that way 
presupposes that this is a suitable issue for the courts.”53 This is a surprising thing to 
say. Leaving aside the questions at issue in the appeal about who has authority to 
raise the question, how is the allegation that Lucy’s treatment constitutes a violation 
of Alberta’s Animal Protection Act not “suitable for the courts”? Furthermore, the 
appellants’ argument that there is no other reasonable or effective alternative to bring 
the issue before the courts is not just some rhetorical sound bite; it is one of the 
elements in the test for public interest standing54 (which the majority does not 
address).
Perhaps Slatter J.A. means that the issue is unsuitable for the courts because 
asserting the interests of animals is not a suitable thing to do in court. It is unlikely 
that an analogous assertion would be made if the interests of human beings, rather 
than animals, were at stake. Imagine, for example, that the issue was alleged 
mistreatment by officials of a human somehow impeded from bringing an action on 
his or her own behalf, such as a child55 -  and consider the likelihood of a judge’s 
intimating that that would not be a suitable issue for the courts. Despite the 
majority’s suppression of any suggestion that the case might be about animals or 
elephants, the fact that it actually does have something to do with an elephant seems 
to exert a degree of influence, even if unacknowledged, on the analysis.
Dissenting Reasons for Judgment (Fraser C.J.A.) 
1. The Sierra Club of Canadian Animal Law?
Fraser C.J.A.’s reasons begin with her discussion of the evolution and motivation of 
laws protecting animals from mistreatment. This emphasis of the place of animal 
protection in law is important to her reasoning, probably the key argument in her 
dissent, that the case engages the rule of law and concerns “the right of the people in 
a democracy to ensure that the government itself is not above the law.”56 The law 
provides certain protections to animals; the West Edmonton Valley Zoo is run by the 
City, part of the government; and Lucy, the intended beneficiary of the legal 
protection, is not in a position to engage the legal process for herself. This is the 
context against which the importance of the standing question should be viewed; “if
53 Reece, supra note 1 at para 35.
54 Canadian Council o f Churches v Canada, [1992] 1 SCR 236 at para 37.
55 This analogy is also invoked in a blog posting by David Cheifetz (“The Elephant in the Room” (5 
August 2011), online: slaw http://www.slaw.ca/2011/08/05/the-elephant-in-the-room/): “Substitute child 
for animal in the Alberta legislation involved.. .call it the Child Protection Act, and assume everything 
else is effectively the same. Would the majority have made the same decision and on the same grounds? 
If not, their analysis is wrong. If they didn’t see that, they should have.”
56 Reece, supra note 1 at para 39.
animals are to be protected in any meaningful way, they, or their advocates, must be 
accorded some form of legal standing.”57
Fraser C.J.A. goes further than simply pointing out that the Alberta 
legislature has recognized animal welfare as a value worth protecting. She engages 
in a detailed and extensively researched discussion of the development o f animal- 
protection law, the history of ideas about animal rights, and proposals that have been 
advanced for legal reforms in the interest of justice for animals,58 and refers to the 
work o f many of the leading scholars in this area, including David Favre, Gary 
Fancione, Steven Wise, Cass Sunstein, Martha Nussbaum, Peter Sankoff, Lyne 
Letoumeau and Richard Ryder59 -  as well as Jeremy Bentham,60 who was among the 
first to call for legislation for the protection of animals.61
Of course the orientation and stances of the thinkers are not uniform, any 
more than are those of, say, feminists. Arguably the wholesale endorsement of these 
thinkers’ views lends a somewhat unfocussed air to Fraser C.J.A.’s reasons. At one 
point she claims that the key element which grounds animals’ rights in the legal 
system is sentience, their ability to feel pain and to suffer.62 Elsewhere it is Lucy’s 
higher cognitive functions, and in particular the complexity o f elephants’ 
communicative and social life, that engage Fraser C.J.A.’s concern.63 And, in a 
vestigial appearance of the Great Chain of Being, all of this is coloured by the claim 
that humans are “at the top of the evolutionary chain.”64 Yet it would be unrealistic 
to expect this breakthrough assertion of the legitimacy of animal rights to be 
accompanied by a theoretically rigorous and consistent account o f why animals (and 
which animals) should count in the legal system. The question in Reece is simply 
whether they get a foot in the door, and to the extent that philosophical thinking is 
relevant to that question it is sufficient to note that there are many lines of such 
thinking in support of an answer in the affirmative.
57 Ibid at para 70.
58 Ibid at paras 51-71.
59 See, e.g., ibid at para 54 n 24, para 61 n 34 and paras 65-70.
60 Ibid at para 54 n 23. It is regrettable that the reasons of Fraser C.J.A. were written too early to contain a 
mention of a remarkable recent Canadian contribution to this field: Sue Donaldson & Will Kymlicka, 
Zoopolis: A Political Theory o f Animal Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
61 Principles of Morals and Legislation (New York: Hafher Publishing Co., 1961) [first published 1789] at 
310.
62 Reece, supra note 1 at para 39.
63 Ibid at para 104.
64 Ibid at para 58. This is reminiscent of the judgment for Lamer J.A. for the Québec Court of Appeal in R 
v Ménard (1978), 4 CR (3d) 333, 43 CCC (2d) 458.
It is gradually becoming more common for arguments promoting the 
interests of animals to be advanced in a legal setting, and occasionally to be 
addressed in jurisprudence, but this may the most extensive discussion of the ethical, 
philosophical and juridical questions implicated in the relationship between humans 
and other animals ever to appear in the reasons for judgment of a court of law. By 
contrast, consider the judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States in U.S. v 
Stevens,65 which concerned the constitutionality of a statute criminalizing the 
creation, possession and sale of videos depicting cruelty to animals.66 The Court 
contented itself with acknowledging almost in passing that the prohibition of animal 
cruelty had “a long history in American law”67 before going on to analyze the First 
Amendment issues; they were hardly examined through the “animal welfare lens,” to 
use Fraser C.J.A.’s phrase.68 Contrast also the judgment of the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents,69 which concerned 
the patentability of a transgenic “oncomouse” created through genetic engineering to 
be susceptible to developing cancer (and so more useful for certain types of lab 
experimentation in cancer research). The Court dismissed the “animal welfare 
implications” of this technology as “only tenuously linked”70 to the question of 
whether the mouse should be excluded from the patent scheme for reasons of 
morality or public policy. Direct comparison can be of limited value in cases 
involving such different legal issues and contexts, but it is fair to say that Fraser 
C.J.A.’s dissent demonstrates a degree of openness to treating animal welfare as a 
serious legal issue that is qualitatively different from the judgments in Stevens and 
Harvard.
Fraser C.J.A. sees the law as having evolved from an “exploitive model” to 
one based on a paradigm of animal welfare.71 She may be overstating the case. The 
inexorable march of progress that she portrays towards an increasingly more 
enlightened and morally grounded relationship between humans and other animals 
would no doubt be a very good thing, but it could be argued that in practice the 
opposite is happening. The utilitarian quantum of animal suffering (in intensity of 
pain multiplied by the sheer number of animals affected) has increased markedly
65 599 US 130 S Ct 1577 (2010) [Stevens],
66 The types of videos that the statute was intended to suppress included films of dog fights, as well as the 
deeply disturbing category of sex-fetish “crush” videos depicting small animals such as kittens and baby 
mice being tortured and crushed to death, typically by a woman with bare feet or in high heels (130 S Ct at 
1583).
67 Ibid at 1585. Alito J., dissenting, would have accorded more significance to the government’s 
“compelling interest” in preventing animal torture (ibid at 1600).
68 Reece, supra note 1 at para 47.
69 2002 SCC 76, [2002] 4 SCR 45 [Harvard].
70 Ibid at para 168.
71 Reece, supra note 1 at paras 54-57.
over the past half century with the growing predominance of intensive confinement 
methods of raising animals for food. Canadian animal-protection law provides little 
protection for animals used in legally sanctioned enterprises for the benefit of 
humans, especially food production (as the exemption in section 2(2) of Alberta’s 
Animal Protection Act for “reasonable and generally accepted practices” of animal 
husbandry illustrates). In this sense the legal model is arguably more “exploitive” 
today than it ever was in the past.
At the same time, there is a discernible evolution in the law towards 
recognizing animals as morally significant and providing them with better protection, 
as well as an understanding that the values reflected in such protections are not just 
incidentally but fundamentally connected to the deepest principles o f the legal 
system. One example of this evolution, mentioned by Fraser C.J.A., is the growth of 
protection for the welfare of individual animals in international and European law.72 
The Council of Europe has stated on its web site that “respect for animals counts 
among the ideals and principles which are the common heritage o f its member States 
as one o f the obligations upon which human dignity is based.”73 Are such statements 
nothing more than fine expressions of sentiment that have no effect on what happens 
in real life? The real risk that this ostensible evolution in the law will fail to live up 
to its own promise animates Fraser C.J.A.’s concern to provide adequate flexibility 
in the judicial system to ensure that animal protection law will actually have some 
effect.
Fraser C.J.A.’s dissent picks up on ideas that have been developed by 
scholars and activists about extending notions of justice to beings other than humans
-  ideas that the traditional justice system has not accommodated to any significant 
extent so far -  and it introduces those ideas into the realm of mainstream judicial 
reasoning.74 It thus resembles a very famous dissent, that of Douglas J. in Sierra 
Club v Morton .75 In his dissent in Sierra Club, Douglas J. adopted the arguments of 
environmental legal scholars (notably Christopher Stone76) in espousing the radical 
legal theory that “[contemporary public concern for protecting nature's ecological 
equilibrium should lead to the conferral of standing upon environmental objects to 
sue for their own preservation”77 through human “spokesmen.”78 In a striking
72 Ibid at para 58 n 31.
73 Council of Europe, “Introduction: Biological safety and use of animals by humans,” online: 
http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co%2Doperation/biological_safety_and_use_of_animals/Introdu 
ction.asp#TopOfPage.
74 It may be a dissenting judgment, but it is a dissent by the chief justice of a province, and that is 
mainstream enough.
75 405 US 727 (1972) [Sierra Club],
76 “Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects” (1972) 45 S Cal L Rev 450.
77 Sierra Club, supra note 75 at 741-42.
parallel to Douglas J.’s proposal, Fraser C.J.A. (albeit in a footnote and in a more 
equivocal, more Canadian tone) states that it is “an open question whether the 
common law has now evolved to the point where, depending on the circumstances, 
an animal might be able to sue through its representatives to protect itself.”79
The idea that “valleys, alpine meadows, rivers, lakes, estuaries, beaches, 
ridges, groves of trees, swampland, or even air”80 should have standing at law has 
not so far been adopted as part of American jurisprudence, but the Sierra Club 
dissent did serve to strengthen and legitimize a new way o f thinking about legal 
protection of the non-human that has been an important influence on the subsequent 
development of the law in the United States and beyond. The challenge that it poses 
to the narrow American doctrine of standing may well have played a background 
part, for example, in shaping the Canadian doctrine of public interest standing.
Animal law today is at a similar stage of development to environmental law 
in the 1970s, and perhaps Fraser C.J.A.’s dissent is the equivalent of a Sierra Club 
for Canadian animal law. Her adoption of an “animal welfare lens” for looking at a 
case about an animal may not be followed in standard doctrine now or any time 
soon, but the ideas she articulates may well contribute to the gradual emergence of a 
stronger framework of legal protection for animals in this country.
As is to be expected in light of their fundamental difference in orientation, 
Fraser C.J.A. also disagrees with the majority on the more purely legal points raised 
in the appeal. An analysis of their different approaches suggests a need for 
clarification by the Supreme Court of the doctrines at issue in this case, as elaborated 
in the discussion that follows.
2. Public Interest Standing and Abuse of Process
For Fraser C.J.A., the “central issue” in the case is whether the appellants are entitled 
to public interest standing.81 She finds, based on the factors set out in Finlay and the 
“standing trilogy,” that they are.82 She calls it a “fatal flaw”83 in the reasoning of the 
chambers judge (and, by implication, of the majority) to have barred the proceedings
78 Ibid at 745.
79 Reece, supra note 1 at para 179 n 143.
80 Sierra Club, supra note 75 at 743.
81 Reece, supra note 1 at para 141.
82 Ibid at paras 172-196.
83 Ibid at para 139.
as an abuse of process without first considering whether public interest standing 
should be granted; that, she says, “is putting the cart before the horse.”84
Given how closely standing and the validity of a cause of action can be 
related -  as Le Dain J. stated in Finlay, the questions do tend to merge85 -  it is very 
difficult to tease out which really is the cart and which is the horse. Fraser C.J.A. 
does not provide an entirely satisfactory response to the majority’s point that a 
plaintiff must have both standing and a cognizable legal basis for his or her claim, 
and having one does not make up for lacking the other.86 Fraser C.J.A. argues that if 
the appellants are entitled to standing then their action cannot be an abuse of process, 
because “the threshold test for granting public interest standing will already have 
addressed the question of whether the relief sought is justiciable and amenable to an 
action grounded in public interest standing.”87
But this contention does not so much resolve how the two tests work 
together as it reiterates a substantive disagreement with the majority about the result 
of their application in this case. Slatter J.A. might respond that because the 
appellants’ action is an abuse of process it is not justiciable or amenable to an action 
grounded in public interest standing, and so they cannot be entitled to public interest 
standing. Fraser C.J.A. undermines her own position by arguing both that the 
proceedings cannot be an abuse of process if the test for public interest standing is 
met (as she finds it to be, as a matter of law), and that the abuse of process issue 
“could only be properly decided after a full hearing on the merits.”88
It is regrettable that clarification was not provided by the Supreme Court of 
Canada on this point, which is potentially relevant to many cases where concerned 
citizens employ creative legal strategies to uphold law and public policy in areas 
such as environmental protection. When a plaintiff seeks to be granted public 
interest standing, does the doctrine of abuse of process retain an independent role, or 
is it subsumed in the “justiciable or amenable to action” branch o f the test for 
standing? And if it is a separate question, how are the two concepts to be applied in 
a coherent manner? In connection with this question we suggest that the Reece 
majority’s approach to abuse of process, which amounts to the formalistic 
application of (to use yet another zoological metaphor) a pigeon-hole category, 
seems inconsistent with the spirit of Finlay -  because it gets to the conclusion that
84 Ibid at para 141.
85 Supra note 35 at para 38, cited in Reece, ibid at para 139.
86 Ibid at para 25.
87 Reece, ibid at para 140.
88 Ibid at para 155.
the action should be barred without getting to a full exploration of the policy 
considerations involved in public interest standing.
3. Judicial Review and the Use of Criminal Law by Private Citizens
The fatal shortcoming of the appellant’s claim according to the majority -  what 
places it in the abuse o f process pigeon-hole -  is that it involves an attempt to 
enforce the criminal law. Fraser C.J.A. is right to highlight a problematic formalism 
in the majority’s reasoning here. As she observes, the law in question is “criminal” 
only in a rather technical sense; charges under the Animal Protection Act are 
regulatory proceedings and the penalties for violations are fines, not jail terms.89 
Such an expansive construal of what constitutes “penal law,” and thus the scope of 
the category of forbidden proceedings, increases the risk of barring cases that should 
be allowed to proceed. A rule that private actions cannot be used to enforce criminal 
law is obviously sensible in the context of a busybody harassing his or her neighbour 
over an alleged crime that the authorities have declined to prosecute. The issue is 
different and more nuanced when the proceedings involve allegations that a 
governmental body that is carrying on a regulated activity has violated rules 
designed to protect a vulnerable class.
The “penal law” argument also implicates an important issue concerning the 
relationship between civil lawsuits and private prosecution, which is not fully 
explored in either the majority or the dissenting judgment. In Canada, private 
citizens do have an avenue to initiate enforcement of penal or criminal law, and that 
avenue is private prosecution. 90 Private prosecution has been used successfully to 
promote enforcement of environmental and wildlife protection law -  notably in the 
prosecution and conviction o f Syncrude Canada over the deaths of 1600 ducks that 
had landed in its tailings pond,91 which was initiated by the environmental group 
Ecojustice -  and also (so far unsuccessfully) in cases involving allegations of cruelty 
to animals.92
89 Ibid at para 149.
90 Section 504 of the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46 [Code], provides that “[a]ny one who, on 
reasonable grounds, believes that a person has committed an indictable offence may lay an information in 
writing and under oath before a justice” and commence a private prosecution. S 795 of the Code extends 
this provision to summary conviction offences (see Reece, ibid at para 142 n 114). Offences under the 
Animal Protection Act are prosecuted under the Provincial Offences Procedure Act, RSA 2000 c P-34, 
which incorporates the summary conviction procedures of the Code (s 3; Reece, ibid at para 78).
91 R v Syncrude Canada, 2010 ABPC 229, 53 CELR (3d) 194, [2010] 12 WWR 524.
92 Hamilton v British Columbia (AG) (1986), 30 C.C.C. (3d) 65 (BCSC) [Hamilton]; Walters v Red River 
Exhibition Ass ’«,119 Man R (2d) 237, [1998] 2 WWR 422 (Prov Ct).
Fraser C.J.A. considers the possibility of a private prosecution in this case 
by assessing whether there is another reasonable and effective way to bring the 
matter to court, which is an element of the test for public interest standing. 
Reviewing the evidentiary record that the Alberta Humane Society, the agent of the 
Attorney General, has “to date refused or declined to charge the City with an 
offence” over Lucy’s treatment,93 she concludes that “it is a reasonable inference that 
any private prosecution against the City by the appellants would be stayed by the 
Attorney General.”94 To proceed from this inference to a conclusion that the 
appellants can seek a remedy in civil court has interesting implications for the 
Attorney General’s traditional discretion to control criminal prosecutions. The 
Crown has “the discretionary right to intervene in criminal matters” and “a private 
prosecutor does not have a legal right or liberty to continue a prosecution in the face 
of Crown intervention.”95 Permitting a potential private prosecutor to circumvent the 
process controlled by the Crown by going through the civil courts instead could be 
seen as undermining that principle.
Perhaps Fraser C.J.A. ’s reasons should inspire consideration of whether the 
private prosecution mechanism, hitherto considered to be entirely subject to the 
unfettered discretion of the Crown, properly fulfills its function in a twenty-first 
century democracy where the law in some meaningful sense belongs to the citizenry
-  in particular in cases where illegal conduct by the Crown itself is alleged. There 
are now at least some limits on the Crown’s traditional absolute immunity from civil 
liability for decisions to prosecute, through the tort of malicious prosecution.96 
(Additionally, in U.S. law, the executive’s broad discretion over prosecutorial 
decisions is subject to the doctrine of selective prosecution, which a defendant may 
(theoretically) invoke as a defence if she can show that she was singled out for 
prosecution on constitutionally prohibited grounds such as race.97)
As a parallel or mirror-image to the availability of a remedy for prosecution 
for the wrong reasons, some possibility for judicial review and redress for citizens 
when the Crown fails to prosecute, or prevents a prosecution from proceeding, may 
well be called for if the Crown’s decision is made in bad faith or based on a conflict 
of interest. A carefully formulated, liberalized approach to the availability of 
declarations or injunctions through the civil court may be the appropriate way to 
realize that possibility.
93 Reece, supra note 1 at para 183.
94 Ibid at para 190.
95 Hamilton, supra note 92 at para 6.
96 Nettes v Ontario, [1989] 2 SCR 170; Miazga v Kello Estate, 2009 SCC 51, [2009] 3 SCR 339.
97 See, e.g., United States v Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
C o n c l u s io n
As with many cases, the differing conclusions of the majority and the dissent in 
Reece flow directly from how the issue is framed. For the majority the concern is the 
legal system and in particular its criminal and regulatory branch, framed narrowly in 
terms of its three principal actors: the Crown, the accused and the courts. The Crown 
must have the exclusive right to initiate proceedings, or at least to decide whether 
proceedings started by outsiders may continue, so in this case the applicants’ request 
for a declaration undermines and abuses that procedural arrangement and may not be 
permitted. For the dissent the frame is broader. It is the polity as a whole, including 
the executive branch and the public, with emphasis of the rights of the latter to hold 
the former to account according to the principles of the rule of law. What seems to 
impel this wider framing of the question is a concern that is broader still: a welcome, 
if overdue, appreciation that there are beings who have hitherto been excluded from 
the polity and whose interests and lives have had little weight in determining either 
the scope or the content o f the justice system.
Lucy, the elephant who once roamed the Sri Lankan jungle, now shut in her 
small enclosure in a cold Canadian city, is a potent symbol of something profoundly 
amiss in the relationship between human beings and other animals -  something 
which could be described as our failure to accord justice to them. Dale Jamieson has 
argued that the problem with zoos goes beyond all the specific failures to meet the 
welfare needs of the animals housed there (although they are many and significant) 
and ultimately is “more difficult to articulate but.. .even more important”:
Zoos teach us a false sense of our place in the natural order. The means of 
confinement mark a difference between humans and other animals. They 
are there at our pleasure, to be used for our purposes. Morality and 
perhaps our very survival require that we learn to live as one species 
among many rather than one species over many. To do this, we must 
forget what we learn at zoos.98
It will take more than legal developments to bring about the change in 
consciousness that Jamieson calls for. (There are some positive signs that such a 
change is already starting to take place in the actions of the public officials 
responsible for running Canadian zoos; last fall the Toronto City Council voted to 
approve a motion to move the Toronto Zoo’s three surviving African elephants, 
Toka, Thika and Iringa, to the same California sanctuary that has been proposed for
98 “Against Zoos” in Peter Singer, ed, In Defense of Animals: The Second Wave (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 
2006) 132 at 142.
Lucy.99) But the dissenting and majority decisions in Reece exemplify, respectively, 
how the law could contribute -  or how it could stand in the way.
99The Calgary Zoo has announced that its four Asian elephants will be moved to other zoos rather than 
elephant sanctuaries, but to zoos where they can live with larger groups of elephants. This decision was 
reportedly based on increased appreciation of the importance of the social structure of a large herd to the 
welfare of the elephants. “Elephants at Calgary Zoo to be relocated” (19 April 2012), online: CBC News 
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/story/2012/04/19/calgary-zoo-elephants-move-relocate.html>.
